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Kashmir is the most thorny and intractable issue 
between India and Pakistan. After the eruption of 
violence in the early 1990s, the conflict assumed 
alarming proportions. It worsened Indo-Pak rela-
tions and brought the two countries to the brink of 
a nuclear catastrophe. Precisely for this reason, the 
international community included Kashmir among 
the major trouble spots of the world and advised 
both India and Pakistan to exercise utmost restraint 
and start negotiations towards its resolution. A short 
historical analysis is essential, from a Kashmiri per-
spective, to understand the emergence of the Kashmir 
problem in its various dimensions.
Origins of the Kashmir Conflict
In 1947, before British India was partitioned, there 
were around 600 princely states. Lord Mountbat-
ten, the last Viceroy, advised the rulers of these states 
to accede to either India or Pakistan. Regarding the 
criteria for deciding which of the two dominions a 
state should join, Lord Mountbatten said, “Normally 
geographical situation and communal interests and so 
forth will be factors to be considered.” These princely 
states acceded to either of the two dominions on 
these principles. Although the rulers of Junagarh, 
hyderabad, and Jodhpur wished to accede to Paki-
stan, they were rejected by India on the grounds that 
they were contravening the partition plan because the 
majority of the populations in these princely states 
were hindus. The problem over Kashmir arose as 
“India laid claim to every hindu majority area, on 
similar grounds Pakistan laid claim over the Muslim 
majority state of Kashmir, but such claim was always 
rejected by India.” Thus a dispute over the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir occurred and both the parties 
resorted to different methods and even fought wars to 
acquire this disputed state. 
The tribal invasion in 1947, the “accession of 
Kashmir” to India, and the Indo-Pak war in the same 
year changed the entire map of Jammu and Kashmir 
and divided it into two parts—Indian administered 
Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir. The 
“accession” of the state to the Union of India signed 
by the then ruler Maharaja hari Singh did not mark 
the end of dispute over Kashmir for two reasons. 
First, the accession was made subject to the condi-
tion of the will of people to be ascertained after the 
restoration of normalcy in the state. Second, the issue 
became internationalized, as it was referred to the 
United Nations by the government of India. Besides, 
in both the Tashkent and Simla agreements following 
the wars of 1965 and 1971 respectively, it was agreed 
that the Kashmir issue constitutes a dispute that 
needs to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. 
Since then, developments within and outside 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir had tremendous 
impacts on the psyche of the Kashmiri Muslims and 
resulted in their complete alienation from the rest of 
India. The installation of repressive regimes by the 
Union Government in New Delhi through unpopu-
lar and undemocratic methods, erosion of autonomy 
granted under article 370 of the Indian constitution, 
the systematic encouragement of corruption and 
nepotism, non-development of the state, problems 
of poverty and unemployment, impact of communal 
violence both within and outside the state, oppor-
tunistic alliances and accords between the National 
Conference (NC) and Congress Party, and electoral 
malpractices greatly influenced the young Kashmiri 
Muslims. Outside India, developments in Afghani-
stan, the Iranian revolution, the situation in Eastern 
Europe, and the break up of the Soviet Union also 
contributed in influencing Kashmiri youths towards 
looking for an alternative road.
The Roots and Growth of Militancy 
Many youths in the late 1980s concluded that salva-
tion lay in secession from India, which could be 
achieved only through an armed struggle. Meanwhile, 
Pakistan had been eagerly looking for an opportunity 
to exercise its influence over Kashmir and was also 
keenly waiting to avenge the humiliation inflicted 
upon it by India during the 1971 war. The growing 
situation in Kashmir Valley suited Pakistan, which 
started providing arms and ammunition to the angry 
young Kashmiri Muslims. As a result, an armed 
movement was established which received massive 
support in Muslim dominated areas of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Apart from common Kashmiris, “govern-
ment employees, the police forces, the academic 
intelligentsia and even some top bureaucrats sup-
ported the separatist slogans raised by the militants.” 
The situation worsened to the extent that it became a 
question of re-establishing the Indian state’s writ over 
Kashmir.
In order to eradicate this armed militancy in the 
state, the Indian security forces resorted to force. The 
security forces used draconian measures, including 
identification parades, house-to-house searches, cus-
todial killings, illegal detention, rape and molestation 
of Kashmiri women, and related coercive methods. 
The counter attacks by the militants were equally 
vicious, and as a result thousands of people were 
killed and numerous others physically and mentally 
disabled. Property worth billions of rupees was 
destroyed, as a large number of houses and even total 
localities were ravaged during encounters or exchange 
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of fire between the Indian security forces and the 
armed militants. 
As a result, for the first time since 1947, the Kash-
miri separatist movement took recourse to a violent 
upsurge with significant mass support. Kashmir 
had witnessed the politics of protest and separatism 
earlier, and at times even militant organizations were 
formed, but they failed to mobilize mass support. 
In the 1990s, the situation was different; there was a 
complete disruption of the administrative machinery 
and the state was brought under Presidential rule for 
six years from 1990-1996. During this period there 
was a complete political vacuum as almost all the 
pro-Indian political parties became dormant or irrel-
evant. The separatists floated their own organizations. 
Elections were held in 1996 for the state legislative 
assembly, resulting in the National Conference (NC) 
led by Farooq Abdullah forming the government. 
But the low voter turnout and the unending violence 
in the state rendered the government completely 
impotent. Besides, the failure of the government to 
fulfill its election promises—including the restoration 
of autonomy to the state, ending human rights viola-
tions, relief to the victims of violence, safe return of 
Kashmiri hindus to their homes, and an end to the 
unemployment problems—made it unpopular. Thus 
in the 1990s, the armed movement gained momen-
tum, while good governance remained a far cry, with 
human rights issues assuming significance.
The Challenges of Governance in 
Contemporary Kashmir
Elections were again held in 2002 for the J&K state 
legislative assembly. These elections are considered to 
be important for the following reasons: first, despite a 
boycott call by the separatists, more then 34 percent 
of eligible voters participated in the elections; second, 
the strongest regional party of J&K—the National 
Conference—was voted out of power and a new 
coalition government led by the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) and the Congress came to power under 
the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. 
During the election campaign Mufti’s PDP 
assured the people that if voted to power, it would 
work for good governance and release of prison-
ers, provide relief to the victims of violence, create 
conditions for the return of Kashmiri migrants to 
their native homes and rehabilitation of surrendered 
militants, repeal those laws which give unlimited 
powers to the Indian security forces, create employ-
ment opportunities for the unemployed, work for 
demilitarization, and finally strive to achieve an hon-
orable solution to the Kashmir problem according to 
the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
After taking the reigns of government, Mufti 
described all such ideas as elements of his “healing 
touch philosophy.” Since the unending violence of 
the past several years had brought large-scale trouble 
and trauma to the people of the state, “healing touch” 
has been described as a systematic process to heal up 
their wounds. The significant voter turnout in the 
2002 elections was an indication of the fact that the 
people were expecting that the formation of a new 
government in J&K would usher in a new era of 
peace and prosperity. 
Unfortunately, an assessment of the performance 
of the Mufti-led coalition government would reveal 
that it failed to fulfill the people’s expectations. 
Mufti’s promises also proved to be Machiavellian in 
nature. The corruption and misuse of official posi-
tions by the bureaucrats and politicians continued 
unabatedly. The demolition drive launched against 
illegal construction on state land ultimately turned 
into a campaign against poor people and not against 
the illegal construction of rich drones. The number 
of unemployed persons in the state crossed over the 
two hundred thousand mark. The record of human 
rights violations reached an all time high. Custodial 
killings increased by three times as compared to the 
era of Farooq’s government. The plight of Kashmiri 
migrants did not change and they could not return 
to their respective homes despite the tall claims of the 
government that normalcy had been restored. The 
council of ministers was expanded up to 45 percent 
of the total strength of the state assembly. 
however, Mufti’s government cannot be ignored 
in terms of its positive role in supporting the ongoing 
peace process between India and Pakistan. During 
Mufti’s tenure in office, the peace process gained 
momentum and the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus 
service was opened for the passengers of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
After completion of its three years, the PDP 
handed over the chief minister post to its coalition 
partner, the Congress Party, in 2005. The immediate 
challenges of the Congress-led coalition government 
were to work for the rehabilitation of victims affected 
by the October 2005 earthquake, and carry forward 
the common minimum program agreed between the 
coalition parties. New Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi 
Azad assured a clean administration to the state, and 
announced the launching of a crusade against corrup-
tion and nepotism, which would thus work towards a 
Khushal (developed) state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Unfortunately, Azad’s campaign against corrup-
tion also proved to be merely a hoax, as not only the 
top bureaucrats and police officers but also some 
ministers of his government have been described as 
involved in corruption and exploitation of Kashmiri 
women in a sex scandal. Although during his tenure 
two Round Table Conferences have been held on 
Kashmir, nevertheless the peace process between 
India, Pakistan, and some Kashmiri separatists lost 
its pace, with Azad apparently pursuing the policy 
of the Congress Party and thus viewing the Kashmir 
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crisis merely as a law and order problem. This is pos-
sibly the reason why most of the Kashmiris have lost 
their interest in the ongoing peace process within the 
Indian state. Moreover, the worsening of the relations 
between the two coalition partners has also affected 
the administrative performance of the Azad govern-
ment, resulting in its diminishing popularity among 
Kashmiris.
Meanwhile the violence in Kashmir is continuing 
unabatedly, causing significant damage to the lives 
and property of innocent people. This continuous 
destruction of lives and property is not helping the 
changed psychological situation in the Valley, where 
there is a sincere desire amongst the Kashmiri people 
to end the violence, and an earnest belief that the 
conflict in Kashmir could be resolved only through 
a meaningful process of political negotiations. This 
trend could be seen in terms of the decline in Kash-
miri Muslims joining the militant groups. Today, the 
indigenous character of the militant movement is 
weakening day by day. 
Conclusion: A Vision for Kashmir’s Future
Kashmir has always remained a bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan. In fact, there are three 
legitimate parties involved in this conflict—India, 
Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir. Each party has 
taken its own position on the question of Kashmir. 
For India, Kashmir is one of its integral parts, 
and hence this aspect is not open for dispute. For 
Pakistan, Kashmir represents a problem of parti-
tion, which is yet to be resolved. But for the people 
of J&K, Kashmir is not simply a territorial dispute 
between India and Pakistan, and cannot be resolved 
without the involvement of those who are the main 
party in this dispute. None of the parties involved 
in the dispute has shown any flexibility at any time 
in their stated positions on Kashmir, and as a result 
the dispute continued until it assumed the greatest 
degree of ferocity and finally became, in recent years, 
a nuclear flash point. All of the bilateral agreements 
signed over the years between different parties have 
proven to be exercises in futility. 
The fresh negotiations launched between India 
and Pakistan and also between India and some 
Kashmiri separatists have generated positive hope in 
the region. It is largely believed that if the concerned 
parties will continue the process of negotiations by 
talking to one another—with more flexibility and 
exploring options beyond their stated positions—
they will succeed in finding an acceptable solution to 
the vexed Kashmir problem. The new initiative has 
also generated a heated debate among many circles 
about the final solution of Kashmir. In this regard, 
numerous potential solutions are being proposed and 
discussed. however, in the given circumstances, the 
only possible solution is one in which every party will 
find itself in a win-win position. This objective can be 
achieved only after the re-unification of the divided 
state of Jammu and Kashmir and then giving it a sub-
sovereign status. 
The areas that are under Pakistan’s control, includ-
ing Gilgit and Baltistan, should be brought together 
with the areas under India’s control (leaving Aksai 
Chin, which China will never return). Both Indian 
and Pakistani forces could jointly man the interna-
tional border of the re-united Jammu and Kashmir. 
The currency of both countries could be acceptable in 
the state. Both would also speak in all international 
and regional fora on behalf of Jammu and Kashmir 
and thus manage its foreign affairs together. In view 
of its heterogeneous character, the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir would adopt a democratic polity 
based on the federal structure. In this way, the new 
sub-sovereign or semi-sovereign state of Jammu and 
Kashmir could act as a virtual bridge between India 
and Pakistan and would pave the way for peace, prog-
ress, and prosperity in the entire region of South Asia, 
which otherwise seems to be a distant dream. Thus, 
by working in close collaboration with one another, 
the three parties can become close friends and after a 
gap of few years can also think on the lines of grant-
ing the semi-sovereign state of Jammu and Kashmir 
complete sovereign status.
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